Chain tally · percentages of tallied voting power
280.8M DGN voted.
Proposal status
Passed
PROPOSAL_STATUS_PASSED
Tally evidence
Live response
Independent tally endpoint
Vote records
0
Complete next_key scan · records, not unique voters
Deposit records
0
Complete next_key scan
Voting closes
Nov 10, 2026, 08:55:34 PM UTC
proposal.voting_end_time
Filed summary
This is a signal vote. It moves no funds. A later chain upgrade (v13.3) would carry out the result and needs its own vote. WHAT HAPPENED On 2026-11-07 an attacker used a bug in the DGN bridge contract to create about 10M unbacked DGN on Base, redeemed it from the bridge escrow on dungeon-1, and sold about 10M DGN into the DGN/USDC pool for about 3,123 USDC. The price fell about 52%. Bridges, DEX swaps and deposits are paused. Pool withdrawals remain open. WHAT THIS VOTE ASKS Should validators, in a future upgrade: 1. Move 10,000,000 DGN from the DGN/USDC pool back to the bridge escrow. This restores the escrow. On today's pool balances (26.47M DGN, 6,198 USDC) the price would go from about $0.000234 to about $0.000376. 2. Add about $840 of USDC to the pool to buy DGN, taking the price to about $0.000485, the level before the sale. The funding source will be published before the v13.3 vote. Numbers will be recalculated from live balances before the upgrade. WHO PAYS Liquidity providers still in the pool at the upgrade share the removal of 10M DGN in proportion to their stake. Staked positions take 1 day to unbond, and anyone can withdraw before the upgrade. This vote does not recover the stolen USDC. CONFLICT OF INTEREST Lee Berman's main wallet (dungeon13gd97ke6erejqk2p050xkpc63jhtujre26s0gg) holds 57.6% of this pool's shares. He would pay that share of the 10M DGN removal and would benefit from a higher price. Crypto Dungeon LLC runs the CryptoDungeon validator. This proposal is submitted from the project recovery wallet. LIMITS Changing a pool's balance by chain upgrade is an unusual step, and this proposal has had no legal review. The attacker's remaining Base DGN, about 1.4M, must not be able to redeem from the refilled escrow, so the DGN bridge stays closed until that is handled. HOW TO VOTE Yes: prepare v13.3 with these steps. No: leave the pool as it is. Abstain: no view. No with veto: this should not have been proposed; if veto votes pass 33.4%, the deposit is burned.
Tally source
Yes
100.00%
280.8M DGN
No
0.00%
0 DGN
Abstain
0.00%
0 DGN
No with veto
0.00%
0 DGN
Shares use the exact integer tally total as denominator. Display percentages are rounded to two decimals; threshold decisions use the full voting power.
Quorum
62.59% turnout
33.40% required
280.8M / 448.7M DGN
Approval threshold
100.00% yes
>50.00% required
Yes divided by Yes + No + NoWithVeto; abstain is excluded.
Veto threshold
0.00% veto
≤33.40% required to avoid veto
NoWithVeto divided by all tallied voting power.
Proposal timestamps
Submitted
Returned timestampNov 7, 2026, 08:55:34 PM UTC
proposal.submit_time
Deposit period ends
Returned timestampNov 10, 2026, 08:55:34 PM UTC
proposal.deposit_end_time
Voting begins
Returned timestampNov 7, 2026, 08:55:34 PM UTC
proposal.voting_start_time
Voting ends
Returned timestampNov 10, 2026, 08:55:34 PM UTC
proposal.voting_end_time
These are proposal response fields, not independently observed chain events. An unset zero-time remains explicitly not set.
Independent source register
| Evidence | Endpoint | Coverage | State |
|---|---|---|---|
| Live tally | /cosmos/gov/v1/proposals/:id/tally | Exact integer tally fields returned | Available |
| Vote records | /cosmos/gov/v1/proposals/:id/votes | 0 records after following next_key to completion | Available |
| Deposit records | /cosmos/gov/v1/proposals/:id/deposits | 0 records after following next_key to completion | Available |
| Staking pool | /cosmos/staking/v1beta1/pool | bonded_tokens available for turnout denominator | Available |
| Tally parameters | /cosmos/gov/v1/params/tallying | effective regular threshold 0.500000000000000000 · quorum 0.334000000000000000 · veto 0.334000000000000000 | Available |
Wallet action
The voting control is enabled only by its existing wallet and proposal-status rules. The evidence panels above do not sign or broadcast transactions.
Executable payload
No message payloads returned
The proposal response contains an empty messages array. This is a valid proposal-field reading, not a source failure.
Proposal response
Exhaustively paginated response
Valid empty vote scan
The vote helper followed next_key to completion and returned zero current vote records.
0 vote records after following next_key to exhaustion. “Vote records” is used deliberately; this is not relabeled as a unique-voter count.
Exhaustively paginated response
Valid empty deposit response
The deposit endpoint answered with zero rows. This is distinct from the proposal's own total_deposit field above.
0 deposit records after following next_key to exhaustion.