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Native proposal #48Passed

Signal: repair the DGN bridge shortfall and the DGN/USDC pool after the 11-07 exploit

Chain tally · percentages of tallied voting power

Yes
100.00%
No
0.00%
Abstain
0.00%
No with veto
0.00%

280.8M DGN voted.

Proposal status

Passed

PROPOSAL_STATUS_PASSED

Tally evidence

Live response

Independent tally endpoint

Vote records

0

Complete next_key scan · records, not unique voters

Deposit records

0

Complete next_key scan

Voting closes

Nov 10, 2026, 08:55:34 PM UTC

proposal.voting_end_time

Filed summary

Motion Before the Chain

This is a signal vote. It moves no funds. A later chain upgrade (v13.3) would carry out the result and needs its own vote. WHAT HAPPENED On 2026-11-07 an attacker used a bug in the DGN bridge contract to create about 10M unbacked DGN on Base, redeemed it from the bridge escrow on dungeon-1, and sold about 10M DGN into the DGN/USDC pool for about 3,123 USDC. The price fell about 52%. Bridges, DEX swaps and deposits are paused. Pool withdrawals remain open. WHAT THIS VOTE ASKS Should validators, in a future upgrade: 1. Move 10,000,000 DGN from the DGN/USDC pool back to the bridge escrow. This restores the escrow. On today's pool balances (26.47M DGN, 6,198 USDC) the price would go from about $0.000234 to about $0.000376. 2. Add about $840 of USDC to the pool to buy DGN, taking the price to about $0.000485, the level before the sale. The funding source will be published before the v13.3 vote. Numbers will be recalculated from live balances before the upgrade. WHO PAYS Liquidity providers still in the pool at the upgrade share the removal of 10M DGN in proportion to their stake. Staked positions take 1 day to unbond, and anyone can withdraw before the upgrade. This vote does not recover the stolen USDC. CONFLICT OF INTEREST Lee Berman's main wallet (dungeon13gd97ke6erejqk2p050xkpc63jhtujre26s0gg) holds 57.6% of this pool's shares. He would pay that share of the 10M DGN removal and would benefit from a higher price. Crypto Dungeon LLC runs the CryptoDungeon validator. This proposal is submitted from the project recovery wallet. LIMITS Changing a pool's balance by chain upgrade is an unusual step, and this proposal has had no legal review. The attacker's remaining Base DGN, about 1.4M, must not be able to redeem from the refilled escrow, so the DGN bridge stays closed until that is handled. HOW TO VOTE Yes: prepare v13.3 with these steps. No: leave the pool as it is. Abstain: no view. No with veto: this should not have been proposed; if veto votes pass 33.4%, the deposit is burned.

Tally source

Voting Evidence

Live tally response

Yes

100.00%

280.8M DGN

No

0.00%

0 DGN

Abstain

0.00%

0 DGN

No with veto

0.00%

0 DGN

Shares use the exact integer tally total as denominator. Display percentages are rounded to two decimals; threshold decisions use the full voting power.

Quorum

62.59% turnout

33.40% required

280.8M / 448.7M DGN

Satisfied

Approval threshold

100.00% yes

>50.00% required

Yes divided by Yes + No + NoWithVeto; abstain is excluded.

Satisfied

Veto threshold

0.00% veto

≤33.40% required to avoid veto

NoWithVeto divided by all tallied voting power.

Satisfied
Tally: live proposal tally endpoint. 0 vote records were returned after following next_key to completion; this is not relabeled as a unique-voter total.

Proposal timestamps

Docket Timeline

  1. Submitted

    Returned timestamp

    Nov 7, 2026, 08:55:34 PM UTC

    proposal.submit_time

  2. Deposit period ends

    Returned timestamp

    Nov 10, 2026, 08:55:34 PM UTC

    proposal.deposit_end_time

  3. Voting begins

    Returned timestamp

    Nov 7, 2026, 08:55:34 PM UTC

    proposal.voting_start_time

  4. Voting ends

    Returned timestamp

    Nov 10, 2026, 08:55:34 PM UTC

    proposal.voting_end_time

These are proposal response fields, not independently observed chain events. An unset zero-time remains explicitly not set.

Independent source register

Evidence Integrity

Independent governance evidence source status
EvidenceEndpointCoverageState
Live tally/cosmos/gov/v1/proposals/:id/tallyExact integer tally fields returnedAvailable
Vote records/cosmos/gov/v1/proposals/:id/votes0 records after following next_key to completionAvailable
Deposit records/cosmos/gov/v1/proposals/:id/deposits0 records after following next_key to completionAvailable
Staking pool/cosmos/staking/v1beta1/poolbonded_tokens available for turnout denominatorAvailable
Tally parameters/cosmos/gov/v1/params/tallyingeffective regular threshold 0.500000000000000000 · quorum 0.334000000000000000 · veto 0.334000000000000000Available

Wallet action

Cast a Native Vote

The voting control is enabled only by its existing wallet and proposal-status rules. The evidence panels above do not sign or broadcast transactions.

Executable payload

Proposal Actions · 0

No message payloads returned

The proposal response contains an empty messages array. This is a valid proposal-field reading, not a source failure.

Proposal response

Filed Details

Proposal ID
48
Status
PROPOSAL_STATUS_PASSED
Proposer
dungeon1...0653lh
Submit time
Nov 7, 2026, 08:55:34 PM UTC
Deposit end
Nov 10, 2026, 08:55:34 PM UTC
Voting start
Nov 7, 2026, 08:55:34 PM UTC
Voting end
Nov 10, 2026, 08:55:34 PM UTC
Proposal total_deposit field
500,000 DGN

Exhaustively paginated response

Vote Records

Valid empty vote scan

The vote helper followed next_key to completion and returned zero current vote records.

0 vote records after following next_key to exhaustion. “Vote records” is used deliberately; this is not relabeled as a unique-voter count.

Exhaustively paginated response

Deposit Records

Valid empty deposit response

The deposit endpoint answered with zero rows. This is distinct from the proposal's own total_deposit field above.

0 deposit records after following next_key to exhaustion.

Proposal, live tally, exhaustively paginated vote records, exhaustively paginated deposit records, staking pool, and tallying parameters are independent REST evidence. Ready vote and deposit scans followed next_key to completion with safety guards. Final tally fallback is used only for explicitly final proposal statuses and is labeled.